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This paper employs recently developed econometric models of marginal treatment effects to 
analyze the relevance of labor market comparative advantage and segmentation in the 
participation and earnings performance of workers in formal and informal jobs in Argentina. A 
novel household data set on informality and self-employment and information on labor 
inspections targeting informal work was collected for this purpose. We account for 
endogeneity and selectivity issues in our estimations. Our results offer evidence for both 
comparative advantage and segmentation. No significant differences between the earnings of 
formal salaried workers and the self-employed are found, once accounted for positive 
selection bias into formal work. This is consistent with labor market comparative advantage 
considerations. On the contrary, informal salaried employment carries significant earnings 
penalties, alongside negative selection bias and modest positive sorting. These results are 
more consistent with segmentation. 
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A key question in the labor markets literature of developing countries is the extent
to which informal employment results from segmentation or re￿ ects voluntary choice
and comparative advantage considerations. Following on the Harris and Todaro (1970)
tradition, the conventional ￿ exclusion￿view sees informal workers, either self-employed
or informal employees who lack mandated labor bene￿ts, as the disadvantaged class of
a segmented labor market (Piore, 1979). Workers would prefer the higher wages and
bene￿ts of the formal sector but many are rationed out possibly due to labor market
rigidities such as unions, minimum and e¢ ciency wages, generous labor bene￿ts and
unequal market power arising from low state enforcement of regulations.
The competitive markets or ￿ voluntary￿view of informality sees it as resulting from
workers and ￿rms weighing the private costs and bene￿ts of operating informally (Mal-
oney, 2004). Many informal salaried and self-employed workers, for instance the young,
married women and the unskilled, may voluntarily choose these occupations for various
reasons: as a labor market entry point, to enjoy non-pecuniary bene￿ts such as more
￿ exible hours, to exploit entrepreneurial abilities, to improve mobility, to obtain training
opportunities and to escape taxing regulations and inadequate formal social protection
systems.
The labor literature on compensating di⁄erentials and occupational choice based
on workers￿comparative advantage provides a framework that encompasses these two
views. The basic idea, ￿rst advanced by Adam Smith (1776), is that wages paid to
various types of labor must, in general, equalize total advantages and disadvantages,
pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Workers select occupations that yield the highest net ad-
vantage for their tastes and skills. Comparative advantage can arise because individuals
2gain by choosing the jobs that better ￿t their range of talents including cognitive, social,
and mechanical skills (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1978; Willis and Rosen, 1979; Heckman and
Sedlacek, 1985). These elements are central to the decision of becoming an entrepre-
neur (Lucas, 1978; Lazear, 2005; Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 1998; ￿opo and Valenzuela,
2007). Recent studies indeed show that comparative advantage in the labor market is
a central determinant of occupational choice, human capital investments and earnings
performance (Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman and Li, 2003; Carneiro
and Heckman, 2002). Jobs that are more desirable in terms of their amenities such as
fringe bene￿ts, stability and ￿ exibility or that require relatively abundant skills should
have lower-than-average wages. Jobs that are less desirable or demand scarce skills
should pay higher wages. A competitive labor market determines an implicit wage for
each type of labor. In equilibrium labor mobility leads to a set of relative wages that
makes workers indi⁄erent between the various types of jobs. Given the heterogeneity in
workers￿preferences and skills, both supply and demand for particular jobs determine
the size of the compensating di⁄erential, the di⁄erence in implicit wages, between jobs
with di⁄erent working conditions.
The presence of segmentation or comparative advantage considerations in the labor
market also have di⁄erent policy implications:
￿ In a segmented labor market entry barriers and labor market rigidities prevent
informal worker to participate in the formal sector. Policies to tackle entry barriers
and rigidities could encompass labor market policies and also policies addressing
tax evasion and the design of the social security system that prevent the shift from
informality into formal work.
￿ In a labor market, where labor market comparative advantage consideration prevail,
3informal salaried workers and the self-employed chose and remain voluntary in
certain jobs and thereby maximize their utility. Policies for comparative advantage
reasons would support informal sector participants￿decision to work in the informal
sector instead of shifting them to formality or penalizing them for not being in
the formal labor market. Support for alternative measures of social protection and
social security for informal workers and the self-employed could be a possible policy
option.
This paper uses recently developed econometric methodologies by Heckman and Vyt-
lacil (2001, 2005, 2007) and Heckman Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) to analyze the relevance
of labor market comparative advantage and segmentation in the participation and earn-
ings performance of workers in the self-employed and formal and informal salaried sectors
in Argentina.1 These methods allow the investigation of the links between heterogeneous
ability, earnings, and occupational choice. We link the treatment e⁄ects literature with
conventional Mincer earnings analysis and the generalized Roy model (1951) of selectiv-
ity in occupational choice.
We estimate parametric and semiparametric regressions with local instrumental vari-
ables to obtain a distinct set of treatment parameters, derived from the marginal treat-
ment e⁄ect (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001, 2005; Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006).2
In particular, we estimate the average treatment e⁄ect, the treatment on the treated,
and the treatment on the untreated, for comparing earnings between formal salaried
1Informal salaried workers in our paper are workers without social security a¢ liation and no pensions. The
self-employed do not participate in the main social security system. In the empirical estimation section of this
paper the three groups in the data are described in detail.
2We also estimated polynomial regressions and a di⁄erent set of semiparametric regressions, based on the
polynomial. In this paper we only report the treatment parameters and the comparison of bias and gains and
not other results of these regressions. The remaining results are available upon request from the authors.
4worker, informal salaried workers and the self-employed and to understand the main
labor market features present.
This approach addresses key implications of the theory in the estimation of informal-
formal earnings gaps and solves the empirical problems relating to selection.
First, the ￿ treatment￿impact, becoming formal, might be heterogeneous across indi-
viduals. Workers could bene￿t di⁄erently depending on both their observed and unob-
served characteristics. There is no single representative impact of formality on wages.
Conventional mean regression estimates do not provide a full description of the presumed
earnings gains that any given worker would derive from getting a formal job.
Second, estimation addresses two types of selectivity bias, selection bias and sorting
on the gain. The standard selection bias arises when only part of the outcomes can
be explained by observables. The unobservables give rise to the problem of selection
bias. Outcomes of occupational choice are heterogeneous and individuals chose jobs
with partial knowledge of their idiosyncratic gain. This second bias, sorting on the gain
is generated by the correlation between unobservables that a⁄ect both earnings and job
choice and the fact that the latter depends on the expected return to the observed and
unobserved characteristics of the individual.
In this case, conventional methods, OLS nor IV, result in biased and non-consistent
estimates of the earnings premium of formality for a randomly selected worker. The
semiparametric marginal treatment e⁄ect estimation with local instrumental variables
can estimate treatment parameters when sorting on the gain is present (Heckman, Urzua
and Vytlacil, 2006).
Argentina presents a very suitable context to study these questions. The country ex-
perienced the largest dramatic upward trend in informal salaried employment rates over
the 1980s and 1990s, not limited to small ￿rms only, while the share of self-employment
5remained relatively constant. Initial tests with unconditional earnings gaps, which do
not account for selection on observables and unobservables, reveal that the self-employed
and informal salaried workers seem to face an earnings disadvantage with respect to for-
mal salaried workers suggesting the existence of segmentation.3 However, sociological
survey work and related economic research has identi￿ed a signi￿cant importance of en-
trepreneurship and non-pecuniary motives for self-employment (World Bank, 2007). In
this context a novel data collection on motivations and constraints for formality, infor-
mality and self-employment was attached to the national household survey, which we are
able to use in our estimations. In addition to this, we collect data on the number of labor
inspectors, who are employed under a new labor regulation plan to tackle informality in
the labor market.
Our results o⁄er evidence for both labour market comparative advantage and seg-
mentation. We ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erences between the earnings of formal waged
workers and the self-employed, once accounted for selection. This is consistent with
comparative advantage considerations. On the contrary, informal waged work carries
signi￿cant earnings penalties. There is a considerable negative selection bias into formal
relative to informal waged work and only modest positive sorting based on expected
earnings gains. These results are more consistent with labour market segmentation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss some of the most relevant empir-
ical literature. Then, we outline a simple model of occupational choice, which highlights
the case for the empirical strategy of marginal treatment e⁄ects estimation following
Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006). Next, the data and estimation speci￿cations are
3At the 20th quantile of the earnings distribution the informal-formal salaried worker earnings gap is -53.33
percent, at the 50th -47.77 percent and at the 80th -45.12 percent. For the self-employed-formal salaried worker
earnings gap the numbers are -58.00 percent at the 20th, -37.32 percent at the 50th and -19.20 percent at the
80th quantile. The numbers are based on the authors￿estimation of the EPH-C.
6discussed. This is followed by the empirical results and their implications. The paper
concludes with a summary of the ￿ndings and related policy implications.
2 Empirical tests of the ￿ exclusion￿ and ￿ competitive￿ labor
market views4
An extensive literature has examined empirically the two views of informal employment,
the traditional ￿ exclusion￿and the ￿ competitive￿views. Here we only summarize some
illustrative studies, in particular from the developing country context. However, an early
study in this area was conducted in the U.S. by Dickens and Lang (1985) who used a
switching earnings model with unknown regimes to test empirically the presence of dual
labor markets. Their analysis suggests the presence of labor market segmentation and
dual labor markets. In the Latin America context, Heckman and Hotz (1986) present
evidence of selection-corrected earnings regressions that are consistent with labor market
segmentation among males in Panama. Gindling (1991) also argues for labor market
segmentation using selection corrected wage equations in Costa Rica. A study by Basch
and Paredes-Molina (1996) employed a switching regression model with three equations
with unknown sample separation to test the hypothesis of segmented labor markets
for Chile, and ￿nds support for the segmentation hypothesis. Fields (1990) argued that
informal employment largely reveals the presence of segmentation in developing countries
although he posits that a minority upper tier may conform to voluntary motives.
In contrast Magnac (1991) analyses segmented and competitive labor market in
Colombia with an extended four-sector model. He concludes that comparative advan-
tage in this case seems to be a more prevalent feature and ￿nds support for sector choice
4In this paper we use the terms of exclusion and segmentation interchangeably for each other.
7being determined by tastes and not ability. More importantly, he argues that simply
assessing the di⁄erences in earnings between formal and informal jobs cannot be used
to test segmentation in the labor market as an alternative model/hypothesis of compen-
sating di⁄erentials is necessary to do so. In a similar spirit, Pisani and Pagan (2004)
test the notion of ￿ negative selection￿and ￿ positive selection￿in informal and formal
sector participation in Nicaragua. For instance, workers with low skill levels participate
in the informal sector while workers with high skill levels choose formal work. Using a
three-equation switching model, they ￿nd positive selection for the formal sector and
also for the informal sector, which suggests an element of individual choice. Pianto,
Tannuri-Pianto and Arias (2004) propose quantile earnings regressions with selectivity
bias corrections based on multinomial choice models of the choice between formal, in-
formal salaried and self-employed in Bolivia. Their ￿ndings suggest segmentation at
the lower quantiles of the earnings distribution. They ￿nd little di⁄erence in earnings
between formal and informal jobs at higher quantiles of the earnings distribution, which
they interpret as consistent with voluntary choice by higher productivity workers. Guen-
ther and Launov (2006) test the proposition of segmented and competitive informal labor
markets with an econometric model that accounts for unobservable sector a¢ liation and
selection bias, and also ￿nd evidence of a two-tier structure in informal employment in
C￿te d￿ Ivoire. Yamada (1996), Maloney (1999), and Saavedra and Chong (1999), have
also argued with evidence from Peru, Mexico, and Brazil, that informal self-employed
workers are largely voluntary.
In the case of Argentina, two recent studies have tested the hypothesis of segmen-
tation between informal and formal labor as the de￿ning feature of the labor market.
Pratap and Quintin (2006) use labor force survey data for 1993-1995 to test whether
workers with similar observable characteristics earn more in the formal sector than in
8the informal sector. After controlling for selection on observables with propensity score
matching and accounting for unobservables through a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence matching
estimator they ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erence between formal and informal earnings, ev-
idence against the segmentation hypothesis. On the contrary, Alzua (2006) applies an
endogenous switching regression model without ex-ante de￿nition of sector and ￿nds
evidence in favor of segmentation of the labor market during 1970-1990 and 1991-2000.
As emphasized by Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006), the considerable lack of
consensus in much of the empirical literature on labor market performance re￿ ects the
fact that the causal parameters being estimated are ill-de￿ned. When earnings perfor-
mance is heterogeneous and workers sort into di⁄erent jobs on the basis of expected
gains, conventional OLS, matching and IV estimation does not estimate a well-de￿ned
causal parameter that allows to extrapolate the impact of changes in an individual em-
ployment status on his earnings. Not only observable characteristics, but unobservable
heterogeneity determine the returns. People sort according to their perceived individual
returns in each sector, that is, their comparative advantage.
As noted by Magnac (1991) and stressed recently by Maloney (2004), informal-formal
earnings gaps cannot o⁄er unambiguous tests of segmentation as one needs a model
that allows for compensating di⁄erentials/comparative advantage considerations as an
alternative hypothesis. In a market with no rigidities, informal earnings should be
higher to compensate workers for the lost value of bene￿ts and whatever risk they may
be facing. On the other hand, they may be lower to compensate for taxes evaded,
greater independence and ￿ exibility, or, perhaps for young workers, on-the job training.
Even in the absence of compensating di⁄erentials, Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2006)
recently show that the e¢ cient allocation of more productive labor and entrepreneurship
can lead to a natural matching of lower productivity workers and informal small ￿rms.
9Thus, selection biases and sorting based on gains and tastes are likely to be very relevant
empirical drivers of formal and informal sector participation.
When choosing between informal and formal employment, workers weigh the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each potential job, subject to the availability of jobs with
their desired attributes. Informal and formal jobs di⁄er by more than labor protections.
Formal bene￿ts are just one ingredient in workers￿calculations. Workers equilibrate
utilities￿ not just earnings￿ in choosing between jobs in the two sectors. Comparative
advantage could make the informal sector a better match for many labor market par-
ticipants. Lucas (1978) argued that individuals choose between salaried work and self-
employment, depending on whether they are relatively more talented as an entrepreneur
or as a salaried employee. Some workers might ￿nd that their observed and unobserved
skills are better rewarded in occupations, which have a higher propensity to be informal
such as those in construction sector. Informal jobs may o⁄er an entry point to the labor
market for youth and unskilled middle-age workers that partially remedies de￿cient or
obsolete skills through on-the-job training unavailable to them in formal salaried jobs.
Women, particularly of young age with children, might be willing to forgo some of the
bene￿ts of formality in exchange for the ￿ exibility of informal employment.
Contrary to the previous literature we apply the recently developed marginal treat-
ment methods for models of essential heterogeneity developed by Heckman, Urzua and
Vytlacil (2006) to examine the links between earnings performance and the choice of for-
mal and informal salaried work and self-employment. 5To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst
application of the marginal treatment e⁄ects approach to the analysis of occupational
choice and earnings performance, in particular to characterize informal and formal labor
5Sorting on the gain is the feature of models of essential heterogeneity. Outcomes of occupational choice are
heterogeneous and individuals participate with partial knowledge of their individual gain or loss from the labor
market status, which di⁄ers among individuals (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil 2006).
10markets. This method allows to account for observable and unobservable characteristics
of the individuals that a⁄ect their decision to participate in di⁄erent occupations while
employing less restrictive econometric methods than, for instance, Magnac (1991). This
is done through the explicit estimation of the marginal return of an individual indi⁄erent
between a formal and informal job or between self-employment and dependent worker
status. From this one can derive the standard treatment parameters, average treatment
e⁄ect, treatment on the treated and treatment on the untreated. This is a unique fea-
ture of this paper compared to the previous literature, which does not estimate these
treatment parameters for the di⁄erent sectors in the labor market. From these it is
possible to draw conclusion whether an individual at the margin of indi⁄erence between
di⁄erent job types would gain or loose in terms of wages given his observed and un-
observed characteristics. Depending on the margin of comparison, this in turn would
give an indication whether the segmentation or comparative advantage considerations,
or equivalently whether ￿ exclusion￿or ￿ competitive￿forces, are the important de￿ning
features of the labor market.
3 A model of occupational choice
To formally spell out the issues outlined earlier, consider a simple parametric formulation
of selectivity in occupational choice, based on the Roy model (1951), that connects the
comparative advantage framework and the treatment e⁄ects literature.
Suppose there are two types of occupations indexed by two labor market sectors
s: 1 for dependent salaried work and 2 for self-employment.6 Workers choose their
occupation by comparing the utility Ws they derive from each occupation, which is
6Other margins of choice such as formal salaried versus informal salaried worker can also be represented by
this model.
11given by the sum of the income Ys and non-pecuniary bene￿ts in the sector "s net of




si = Ysi + "si ￿ csi = Z
0
i￿s + ￿si (1)
where W ￿
si , an individual￿ s utility of a particular occupational choice, depends lin-
early on the vectors of observed Z (e.g. human capital, demographics) and unobserved
characteristics ￿ (tastes for work, intrinsic abilities) of the worker i. A worker chooses a
formal occupation when the net bene￿ts of being formal, in welfare terms, are positive:
W1i ￿ W2i () (Y1i￿Y2i)+("1i￿c1i)￿("2i￿c2i) ￿ 0 i⁄ Z
0
i(￿1￿￿2) ￿ ￿1i￿￿2i (2)
Since we only observe participation choices we shall consider the probability of sector
participation conditional on Z = z, or in the language of impact evaluation the proba-
bility of receiving treatment or the propensity score, in this case s = 1 or being formal,
given by P(z):
P(s = 1jZ = z) = P(￿W ￿ 0) () P(Z
0(￿1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2) (3)
where the ￿shave a common distribution F￿s.
We only observe earnings y after participation choices are made, so we should consider
two potential outcomes for any given worker. For a given choice of hours of work, the
potential earnings of any given individual in each sector can be written as:
lny1 = ￿1 + X
0￿1 + ￿1 and lny2 = ￿2 + X
0￿2 + ￿2 (4)
12where X is a subset of Z and (￿1;￿2) are freely correlated and independent of some
components of Z, the ￿ instruments￿ . The ￿s can depend on ￿s in a general way.
In this context the average treatment e⁄ect (ATE) or mean earnings di⁄erential
between dependent salaried and self-employed work conditional on X = x is given by:
E(lny1 ￿ lny2jX = x) ￿ ￿ ￿(X = x) = (￿1 ￿ ￿2) + x
0(￿1 ￿ ￿2) (5)
This yields an earnings model with self-selection. There are two key implications of
the theory for the estimation of earnings gaps in this model (Heckman and Vytlacil,
2001, 2005):
(i) There is no single ￿ representative￿impact of dependent salaried work on wages,
i.e. estimates of the ATE do not provide a full description of the earnings gains that any
given worker would derive from getting a salaried job. The ￿ treatment￿impact, becoming
a salaried worker, is heterogeneous, so workers would bene￿t di⁄erently depending on
their observed and unobserved characteristics.
(ii) The estimation should address selection bias and sorting on the gain generated
by the fact that the decision to participate in the salaried worker sector depends on the
expected earnings return for the individual. Conventional methods such as OLS and
IV do not provide an unbiased consistent estimate of the ATE for a randomly selected
worker in the presence of heterogeneity and selection (Heckman and Li, 2003).
In the context of this paper, the formal-informal earnings gaps can be a⁄ected by
correlation induced by unobserved worker characteristics that a⁄ect earnings and cause
selection, either by choice or rationing, into formal, informal salaried or independent
work. The most talented individuals may be more likely to obtain formal salaried em-
ployment because of better prospects for mobility in a career as wage earner. Individuals
13with more entrepreneurial ability are more likely to succeed as independent workers. On
the other hand, those with low work attachment and little adherence to authority or
rigid work schedules may be excluded from formal salaried employment or voluntarily
seek the ￿ exibility of self-employment even at the cost of lower earnings. In general,
the occupational structure in part re￿ ects di⁄erences in individual tastes for work (e.g.,
industriousness, preference for ￿ exible work schedules and/or being one￿ s own boss), the
value attached to social protection (quality of health, unemployment, old age bene￿ts),
as well as constraints to being in either sector (lack of capital, connections) and the costs
of non-compliance with state regulations (e.g., penalties, social stigma).
In this context it is possible to estimate a wide ranging set of parameters that may
answer di⁄erent policy questions (Heckman and Li, 2003; Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil,
2006; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007). To investigate the role of comparative advantage in
occupational choice as opposed to the segmentation hypothesis the following treatment
parameters are of particular interest, with implicit conditioning on X = x:
The treatment on the treated (TT), the mean wage gain from dependent salaried
work for those who are currently in salaried employee jobs,
E(lny1 ￿ lny2js = 1) ￿ ￿ ￿(s = 1) = (￿1 ￿ ￿2) + x
0(￿1 ￿ ￿2) + E(￿1 ￿ ￿2js = 1) (6)
The treatment on the untreated (TUT), the mean wage gain for those in self-employment
were they to switch to salaried jobs,
E(lny1 ￿ lny2js = 0) ￿ ￿ ￿(s = 0) = (￿1 ￿ ￿2) + x
0(￿1 ￿ ￿2) + E(￿1 ￿ ￿2js = 0) (7)
14These treatment parameters can be derived as weighted averages from an estimate
of the marginal treatment e⁄ect (MTE),
E(lny1 ￿ lny2j￿W = 0) ￿ ￿ ￿(X = x;￿ = ￿ ￿) =
(￿1 ￿ ￿2) + x
0(￿1 ￿ ￿2) + E(￿1 ￿ ￿2jX = x;￿ = ￿ ￿) (8)
This is the mean wage gain from having a dependent salaried occupation for those
workers who are indi⁄erent between salaried and self-employed job conditional on X = x
and at the level of unobservable characteristics ￿ = ￿ ￿. As noted by Heckman and Vytlacil
(2001, 2005) equivalently this can be derived from conditioning on the propensity scores
given the monotonicity of the latent variable model. The MTE can be also interpreted
as a ￿ willingness to pay￿measure (Heckman, 2001). For instance, in the case of formal
salaried and self-employment it gives a measure of the earnings a self-employed worker
is willing to forgo in exchange for non-pecuniary bene￿ts such as more ￿ exibility in the
job or being independent.
From these parameters we can derive measures of two types of biases: selection bias
and sorting on the gain, which is the bias that arises from the sorting of workers based
on expected gains (Heckman and Li, 2003).7 The selection bias is determined by the
di⁄erence of the OLS estimate and TT . Meanwhile the di⁄erence of TT-ATE and TUT-
ATE yield the sorting on the gain or loss respectively. For instance we can determine
the gain of salaried and self-employed-like workers from participating in the salaried and
self-employed sectors compared to a randomly sampled worker.
According to Heckman and Li (2003) the presence of large, positive sorting gains
indicate that comparative advantage considerations of workers are a feature of the labor
7The total bias is de￿ned as OLS-ATE or selection bias + sorting gain.
15market. However, in this paper we take the following as evidence of comparative advan-
tage in the labor market: There are di⁄erences in returns to unobserved characteristics ￿
across the di⁄erent labor market sectors and people self-select into di⁄erent occupations
or job types based on these returns or their tastes.
To understand the prevalence of labor market comparative advantage considerations
and segmentation, we estimate the marginal treatment e⁄ect and account for the se-
lection bias and sorting on the gain in the estimation. At the margin an individual is
indi⁄erent between participation in the two di⁄erent labor market sectors, conditional
on observables and unobservables. A considerable wage gap at the margin and signi￿-
cant treatment parameters would imply that earnings penalty or gain exists between the
two sectors, indicating the presence of segmentation if coupled with modest sorting on
the gain and selection bias. While no signi￿cant earnings gap would give an indication
of labor market comparative advantage considerations and a competitive labor market,
in particular if sorting on the gain and selection bias are accounted for.
4 Data and Empirical speci￿cation
This section outlines the speci￿c data collected for this study and the estimation spec-
i￿cations, in particular the instruments, in the application of the empirical method of
marginal treatment e⁄ect following Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006).
4.1 Data8
The paper exploits unique labor force survey data together with a supplementary infor-
mality survey and administrative data on enforcement of labor laws. We use the Argen-
tine national household survey, the Continuous Permanent Household survey (EPH-C),
8Descriptive summary statistics and variable descriptions can be found in the appendix 3.
16for the second semester and fourth trimester 2005. This household survey covers about
31 urban areas in the country and thereby about 60 percent of the Argentine population.
The survey collects data on demographics, education, income, employment, bene￿ts and
social security contribution of individuals.
In addition to the standard questionnaires of the EPH-C, the Argentine national
statistical o¢ ce (INDEC), with support from the World Bank, implemented a one-time
informality module for the Greater Buenos Aires area, which was attached to the regu-
lar EPH-C in the fourth trimester 2005. This survey collects new, unique data on the
intrinsic preferences of workers for salaried work or self-employment, the multiple moti-
vations for formal and informal salaried work and for self-employment, participation in
the social security system, individual occupational histories, constraints and preferences,
degree of informality of ￿rms and private arrangements to insure against old-age risks.
Moreover, we collect data from the Argentine Ministry of Labor on the number of
workers inspected for violation of labor laws ,including social security contributions, per
province for the year 2005. In the presence of large informality, especially after the
Argentine crisis in 2001/02, the Argentine government stepped up the enforcement of
labor legislation, through the "Plan Nacional de Regularizacion del Trabajo" (PNRT)
in September 2003 (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2004ab). Under this plan labor inspections
examined the level of compliance with labor laws, including social security registration,
of workers by ￿rms. At the time of the inspection visit, inspectors would cross-check the
databases of the tax agency with whether the employees are registered or not. Fines for
non-registration are imposed. A main goal of the PNRT is the registration of workers
to the social security system (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2004ab). The allocation of the
number of labor inspectors, hence also the number of inspected workers and ￿rms, under
the PNRT varies between provinces and largely depends on the population size of the
17province and previous levels of informality measured. In order to account for these
factors, the analysis also controls for population size and GDP per capita per province
from the 2001 national census and the Province of Buenos Aires Ministry of Economy.
4.2 Empirical speci￿cation9
Three di⁄erent groups of labor market participants are employed in the participation
and wage estimations, which follow a Heckman selection correction setup. These three
groups provide the basis for the di⁄erent occupational choice margins of the marginal
treatment e⁄ects and other treatment parameters.
Formal salaried workers are workers working in a dependent employee relationship
with social security contribution through automatic pay reduction or voluntarily; Infor-
mal salaried workers are workers working in a dependent employee relationship without
social security contribution; and Self-employed or independent workers constitute the
group of independent workers with no employees and microentrepreneurs of small ￿rms
with 1 to 5 employees.
The margins of choice and earnings comparisons are the following: (1) dependent
salaried work (formal) versus self-employment, (2) dependent salaried work (informal)
versus self-employment and (3) formal versus informal salaried work.
The dependent variable in the probit model of participation is coded 1 if the indi-
vidual works in the treated status and 0 if the individual works in the comparison work
status. The treated and comparison work status depends on the margin of comparison
estimated:
For the dependent worker status (for the formal workers￿margin and for the informal
9Details of the empirical MTE method by Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) can be found in the appendix
1.
18workers￿margin) is the treatment group and the self-employed are the non-treated. The
decision of work in self-employment, which are not covered by social security arrange-
ments, or a dependent work relationship, either in the formal or informal relationship,
was the motivation for the estimation of these two margins. We also investigate the
participation choice of a job in formal and informal dependent salaried work, so within
the dependent employee relationship. For this margin, formal salaried workers form the
treatment group while informal salaried workers are the comparison group.
The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the natural logarithm of la-
bor income per hour in the main occupation. The earnings model follows a standard
Mincer equation with additional controls (Mincer, 1974).10 The margins of depen-
dent salaried work (formal and informal) versus self-employment are estimated only
for Greater Buenos Aires given the availability of variables that could serve as instru-
ments, which we compiled from our novel data set on informality and self-employment
(see below).
Initial tests of the data show that the marginal treatment e⁄ect estimation under
essential heterogeneity proposed by Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) is applicable
to the margins of choice between self-employment, formal and informal salaried workers.
Essential heterogeneity implies that outcomes of choices, here the wages for the di⁄erent
sectors, are heterogeneous in a general way while the choices themselves are not hetero-
geneous in a general way (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006). Individuals make their
choices with partial knowledge of the outcomes. In our initial tests of the data, using
quantile wage regressions with selectivity correction terms estimated with a multinomial
choice model (as in Tannuri, Pianto and Arias, 2004), we found that this was re￿ ected
10For the variable descriptions, including the base category for the dummy variables, see appendix 3.
19in the di⁄erential magnitudes and signi￿cance of the selection-correction terms.11
In the estimations the participation/choice model for the di⁄erent margins of compar-
isons includes the observable characteristics that are also included in the outcome/wage
model and most crucially the instruments that are not included per se in the wage model
and only enter through the estimation of the propensity score. The actual instruments,
which entered in the estimation for the propensity of participation equation di⁄ered
for the speci￿cations of the di⁄erent margins of occupational choice. In order to get
consistent estimates of the marginal treatment e⁄ect and related parameters, we need
correct speci￿cation of the instruments in the propensity scores and outcome equations
(Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil 2006). We ￿nd strong suggestive evidence that these
conditions are satis￿ed since the instruments enter signi￿cantly in the choice model but
not in the Mincer equations.
For the dependent worker (formal or informal)-self-employed margins the propensity
scores were estimated using as instruments the workers￿reported intrinsic preference for
working in a dependent relationship, from responses to the question "if you were able
to choose, would you rather be a salaried worker or an independent worker?" in the
supplementary informality survey for Greater Buenos Aires. This was found to be a
signi￿cant determinant of occupational choice as can be seen by the signi￿cance in the
choice model, and other results show that it does not enter signi￿cantly in the earnings
Mincer model. This is in line with other research on self-employment and motivations
for self-employment which point at this being driven by largely idiosyncratic motives
(Oswald, Blanch￿ ower and Stutzer, 2001; Cunningham and Maloney, 2001). Similar
results hold for the variable constructed to capture workers￿reported preference for
the occupation. This dummy was coded 1 if the reasons for the current occupation are
11The results are available upon requests from the authors.
20relating to choice and opportunity reasons and 0 if the reasons for the current occupation
are involuntary and income reasons. Other individual-level instruments also included
having the spouse or other relatives employed in the formal sector, which as suggested
by Pratap and Quintin (2006) a⁄ects sector participation and is uncorrelated with wage
outcomes.
For the formal-informal salaried margin the main instruments included to estimate
the propensity score were the number of inspected workers at the province of residence as
a proxy for the cost of informality, which was highlighted by De Soto (1989). Workers
living in provinces with a higher number of inspected workers have a higher propen-
sity to be employed as formal salaried. We also included the indicators for having the
spouse of other relatives employed in the formal salaried sector (Gasparini and Wein-
schelbaum, 2006). These also entered signi￿cantly in the propensity scores regressions.
This follows Heckman and Li (2003), who also include both regional and individual-level
instruments, such as the provincial unemployment rate, parental education and income,
as the determinants of the probability of going to college.
5 Results and implications12
The results are presented in Figures 1 to 9 and Tables 1 to 15. In this section we discuss
the results of the participation and wage models for the three di⁄erent margins and also
the marginal treatment e⁄ect (MTE) estimations, which are performed over the common
support. Thereafter, a discussion of the treatment parameters for the di⁄erent margins
follows.
12In this paper the results for the parametric and semiparametric LIV estimation, which are the most and
the least restrictive in terms of assumptions, are illustrated in detail. The results for the polynomial and an
alternative semiparametric estimator are discussed, but the remaining results are available upon request from
the authors.
21For the margin of formal and informal salaried workers, we ￿nd that variables for
the probit model for the probability of participation in the formal sector are mostly
signi￿cant and exhibit the a prior expected signs (Table 1). For example, females are less
likely to participate in the formal sector. Contrary to this, having higher education levels
makes participation more likely. The individual level instruments, such as whether the
household head has a pension plan or the household human capital, are mostly signi￿cant
and have the expected signs. The cost of informality, the number of inspected workers
per province, is positive and signi￿cant. A higher number of inspections in a province
increases the probability of participation in the formal sector. In Table 2 and 3 the wage
outcome equations are reported for the parametric and semiparametric version with
local instrumental variables. For both formal and informal salaried workers most of the
coe¢ cients are signi￿cant even at the 1 percent level. The selection correction term ￿
for the parametric estimation (Table 2) is signi￿cant for both formal and informal wage
regressions. Overall, the magnitude and signs of the coe¢ cients seem to make sense.
For instance, returns to education increased with higher levels of education completed
(Table 2). This is consistent with the semiparametric outcome for the wage regression
(Table 3). The di⁄erence between treatment (formal) and non-treatment (informal)
betas is signi￿cant. For the returns to education the result remains consistent with the
parametric version. Most coe¢ cients of the non-treated, the informal salaried workers,
are also signi￿cant at the 1 percent level.
In order to estimate the MTE for this margin, the common support condition has
to be full-￿lled. The MTE estimation is only performed over the area of common sup-
port as to make the two groups as comparable as possible in terms of their observable
characteristics. The density of the propensity score z, the probability of selection into
formality is displayed in Figure 1. These results for formal and informal salaried workers
22demonstrate a large common support. It is also possible to see that people who partici-
pate in the formal sector tend to have a higher propensity to participate in the formal
sector.
This explains the higher density of the propensity score for the formal workers at
the right-hand side of the graph, where the higher propensity scores are. Contrary
to this, the density of the propensity score for the informal sector is higher at lower
propensities. Informal workers, who are presently in the informal sector, have a lower
propensity to be formal. Still, this cannot be generalized for all informal workers. In
the medium-range the concentration of the propensity score is less pronounced for either
sample, which implies that according to observed characteristics roughly similar amounts
of individuals have the propensity to be in either sector.
Restricting the estimation over the area of common support, in Figure 2 and Figure
3 the marginal treatment e⁄ect over the range of unobserved heterogeneity is plotted.
The unobservables ￿ are plotted in the reverse to the earlier propensity score z, the
observables. Low values of ￿, the left-hand side of the MTE graph, imply low unobserv-
able heterogeneity and high possibility of participation in the formal sector. High values
of ￿, the right-hand side, imply a high measure of unobservable heterogeneity and low
possibility of participation in the formal sector.
A positive MTE signals a positive return in terms of earnings to formality for a person
who is indi⁄erent, at the margin, between formality and informality, given observables
and unobservables. This indicates that a wage gap exists between formal and informal
salaried work. If the graphed MTE line is not ￿ at or completely parallel to the horizontal
axis across the entire range of unobserved heterogeneity ￿ it indicates that persons,
accounting for their observable characteristics, have di⁄erent returns to participation
across di⁄erent values of unobservables.
23The Figure 2 shows that the MTE from the parametric estimation does not vary
very much across unobservables. It is a near ￿ at line, which we would expect from the
parametric case. A person at the margin between formality and informality were to
gain almost twice as much in terms of wage if they were to become a formal instead of
informal waged worker.
In Figure 3 the parametric assumptions are relaxed and the semiparametric estimator
with local instrumental variable for the MTE is implemented. Di⁄erent results to Figure
2 are apparent: The MTE is almost a straight line until higher values of ￿ exhibit
an increasing MTE. An increase in the MTE at higher values at the measure of the
unobservables implies that a person that is more likely to be informal has a higher
marginal return to formality than a person that is more likely to be formal. This could
mean that a person at the margin between formality and informality were to gain even
more than twice as much in terms of wage if they were to become formal (even higher
increase than suggested by the parametric case). In either case though, informal salaried
workers across di⁄erent levels of unobservables would gain in terms of earnings were they
to become formal.
For the participation margin for the formal salaried worker and the self-employed the
same graphs and tables as previously are displayed and discussed. Contrary to the earlier
estimation here the estimation was performed only for Greater Buenos Aires due the
informality survey at our disposal. The selection problem relating to the participation
in self-employment and formal salaried workers is di⁄erent on several dimensions and
requires other instruments to be included than the formal and informal waged work
margin.
In Table 4 the probit model for the propensity of participation as a formal salaried
worker displays several signi￿cant coe¢ cients at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Most
24notable the instruments for the preference for working in a dependent relationship and
the preference for the occupation are positive and signi￿cant at the 1 percent level.
For instance, higher preference for dependence increases the probability to be a formal
employee instead of self-employed.
In Table 5 and Table 6 the outcome equation results exhibit mostly signi￿cant coe¢ -
cient. Especially, in Table 5 for the formal workers and the self-employed all coe¢ cients
are signi￿cant, except the selection correction term for the formal workers. All of them
display the expected signs and coe¢ cient sizes. For instance, higher levels of education
increase wages. More experience and higher tenure in the profession, here the base cate-
gory is tenure being higher than 5 years, result in higher returns. Being female decreases
the wage compared to being male for both formal workers and the self-employed.
The semiparametric results in Table 6 are signi￿cant for all betas for the non-treated,
the self-employed. The results for the di⁄erence in the beta coe¢ cients between the
formal workers and the self-employed show that only tertiary education and being female
are signi￿cant. The self-employed have a higher wage pay-o⁄ with higher education.
Self-employed women, however, earn signi￿cantly less. This could be an indication for
the di⁄erent self-employed segments: for example, the high-end male entrepreneur on
the one end and the female self-employed who produces and sells small products for
subsistence on the other end.
As previously for the formal-informal salaried worker margin, enough common sup-
port of the propensity scores needs to be present to estimate the marginal treatment
e⁄ect. In Figure 4 nearly the whole range of the propensity score is covered by both
subsamples with the exception at the very lower end of the propensity score.
For formal salaried workers the propensity score has a higher density at high values
as they have a high probability of selection into formality according to their observable
25characteristics (as was seen in Figure 1 as well). For the self-employed though a broad
range of the propensity is spread out quite evenly across all ranges of the propensity.
Observed characteristics of the self-employed are quite heterogeneous.
The MTE estimation over the range of common support is displayed in Figure 5 and
Figure 6. In Figure 5 the parametric estimation of the MTE indicates that across all
unobservables the margin of return to formality is close to zero. The self-employed were
not to gain, or if at all very little, in terms of earnings if they were to be dependent
workers with social security contributions.
Relaxing the parametric assumptions that yield a ￿ at MTE, one can observe that at
the lower values and higher values of the unobservables the results di⁄er to the parametric
case (Figure 6): The self-employed would loose out in terms of wages if they were to
become dependent formal workers. At the lower values of unobservables, the ones with
￿ low-taste￿for self-employment or high propensity to be formal dependent workers, have
a negative return and at higher values, the ones with ￿ high-taste￿for self-employment,
would also experience a negative return if they were to switch to the formal worker labor
market. The middle-range values of unobservables show a small positive return.
Given the previous results from the estimation of the margin of formal salaried work-
ers and the self-employed, which gave an idea about the behavior of the self-employed,
we turn to the informal salaried workers and the self-employed margin to complete the
picture on the labor market. In the choice model of participation in the informal sector
the education variables, tenure, experience, marital status, household head status and
gender are signi￿cant and display expected signs (Table 7). Higher education, more
experience and being the head of a household decrease the likelihood of participation in
the informal sector (or increase the likelihood to be self-employed). Women, individuals
with less than 5 years tenure in the occupation, and singles are more likely to work as a
26dependent worker in the informal sector.
The instruments constructed from the informality survey are both signi￿cant at the
1 percent level and have the expected signs. Preference for dependence increases the
chance for participation in the dependent informal sector. Preference for the occupation
in terms of opportunities and choices decreases the propensity to participate in the
informal dependent sector (Table 7).
The wage regressions in Table 8 have mostly signi￿cant coe¢ cients, with the selection
correction term being signi￿cant for the self-employed. The signs and magnitudes are
as expected. Returns to tertiary education are higher than secondary education. More
experience and tenure increases the wage pay-o⁄. Being female decreases the return to
both informal work and self-employment.
The semiparametric outcome equation results are not as strong in terms signi￿cance.
Education and experience are signi￿cant. For the di⁄erence between the beta coe¢ cients
for both groups secondary and tertiary education are signi￿cant and indicate that the
self-employed have a higher return to education (Table 9).
Testing for the common support, the frequency of propensity scores are graphed for
both groups (Figure 7). The propensity scores for the informal dependent workers, the
treatment group, have a high density at higher propensity values, which indicate more
likelihood to participate in the informal sector. The density for the self-employed is
more evenly spread across the whole range, but at the higher values it indicates fewer
self-employed. Estimating the parametric MTE across, the subsample of the common
support a small negative MTE equal across all unobserables is found (Figure 8). With
the semiparametric MTE the results change slightly (Figure 9): the MTE is still negative
for all individual across the di⁄erent values of unobservables, but with some variation
across the unobservables.
27The summary tables 10 to 14 present a distinct set of summary parameters to under-
stand the di⁄erent labor market features and the accompanying policy questions posed
in this paper: (i) the average treatment e⁄ect (ATE); (ii) the treatment on the treated
(TT) and (iii) the treatment on the untreated (TUT). As shown by Heckman and Vyt-
lacil (2001, 2005) these parameters can be derived from an estimate of the MTE. The
tables show the estimates obtained with parametric, semi-parametric (local instrumental
variables and another semi-parametric method based on the polynomial) and polynomial
estimators (see Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006).13 These are alternative measures
of the mean earnings gain from having a formal occupation for workers with the same
set of observed and unobserved characteristics, who are indi⁄erent between a formal and
an informal job and are found participating in di⁄erent sectors. The ￿gures discussed
earlier present the full MTE estimates from which these are derived.
The results corroborate the mixed view of the Argentine labor market and support
the importance of both comparative advantage and segmentation in workers selection
into formal and informal salaried work and self-employment. On the one hand, the
results reveal little di⁄erence in the earnings of formal salaried and independent workers
once one fully accounts for the sorting of workers based on preferences and the returns
to their observed and unobserved skills. All three treatment parameters are statistically
insigni￿cant. When compared with informal salaried workers, the self-employed are in a
clear advantage. All treatment parameters are negative and of very similar magnitude in
the semi-parametric estimations, while the polynomial results suggest that TT>ATE>
TUT. That is, workers with independent-like observed and unobserved characteristics
would receive much lower earnings were they to move to informal salaried jobs.
On the contrary, for informal salaried workers all treatment parameter estimates are
13The results shown here are robust to di⁄erent empirical speci￿cations and alternative IVs.
28positive and large, and TT>ATE>TUT with only slight di⁄erences. That is, although
there is evidence of some heterogeneity in the earnings gains that informal salaried
workers would derive from formal employment, the di⁄erences are not big. Informal
salaried work carries very large earnings penalties compared to formal salaried work
regardless of the propensity to select into formal salaried employment. That is, workers
with informal-like observed and unobserved characteristics would experience roughly
similar earnings gains were they to move to formal salaried jobs.
The results indicate that selection and sorting biases are important features of these
data. Table 14 presents the estimated selection and sorting biases derived from the
estimated parameters as in Heckman and Li (2003) for each estimation approach. There
is positive selection bias into formal salaried work compared to self-employment, but little
evidence of sorting based on gains. Those entering self-employment in Argentina appear
to be driven by di⁄erences in tastes for type of work and not so much for di⁄erences
in the returns to their observed or unobserved skills in the two sectors. This again
underscores the importance of considering di⁄erences in the non-pecuniary qualities of
independent work. On the other hand, there is a considerable negative selection bias
into formal relative to informal salaried work and modest positive sorting based on
expected earnings gains￿ resulting in an overall large downward biased in conventional
OLS (Table 15) formal-informal earnings gaps. That is, formal salaried workers would
lose out considerably were they to become informal salaried. Unobserved salary work
attributes are rewarded modestly more in formal jobs.
To the extent that these are derived from comparing identical workers at the margin
of indi⁄erence between the two sectors, they provide measures of di⁄erences in earnings
arising from non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs that a⁄ect sector choice or from labor
market disequilibria or segmentation. In particular, the MTE has the interpretation of a
29willingness-to-pay measure, for instance, the earnings that a self-employed worker at the
margin of indi⁄erence would be willing to forego in exchange for the labor bene￿ts of a
formal salaried job. The absence of compensating di⁄erentials between formal salaried
work and independent work suggests that the perceived amenities (i.e., ￿ exibility) and
disamenities (e.g., risk) of self-employment tend to cancel out as predicted by the gen-
eralized Roy (1951) model. This and other evidence points to compensating welfare
di⁄erentials as the main driver of the choice between salaried work and self-employment
in Argentina.
In the case of the formal-informal salaried margin, however, the magnitude of earnings
gaps seems very large to arise from compensating earnings di⁄erentials and suggest the
presence of segmentation between informal and formal salaried employment. As argued
by Magnac (1991), the test of the competitive model of comparative advantage with
micro-data is not capable of properly accounting for this type of disequilibria in the labor
market. Overall, our results are less consistent with informal salaried work resulting from
choice driven by compensating welfare di⁄erentials and seem more consistent with labor
market segmentation.
6 Conclusions
This paper uses recently developed econometric models of essential heterogeneity (e.g.,
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001, 2005; Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006) to analyze the
relevance of labor market comparative advantage and segmentation in the participation
and earnings performance of workers in formal and informal jobs in urban Argentina.
The paper estimates the marginal treatment e⁄ect, the average treatment e⁄ect, the
treatment on the treated, the treatment on the untreated and two biases, the selection
30bias and sorting on the gain from participation and wage outcomes. For the estimations
and our instruments in the participation regression we employ a novel data set on infor-
mality and self-employment and the national household survey. We also collect data on
labor inspections, which were speci￿cally put in place to tackle the lack of social security
registration and thereby informality in the labor market.
The results support the importance of both comparative advantage and segmenta-
tion in Argentina￿ s informal-formal employment composition. On the one hand, there
are no signi￿cant di⁄erences between the earnings of formal salaried workers and the
self-employed regardless of the propensity to select into each sector, but there is positive
selection bias into formal salaried work. This and other evidence points to compen-
sating welfare di⁄erentials as the main driver of the choice between salaried work and
self-employment in Argentina. Workers sort into formal salaried and self-employment oc-
cupations according to labor market comparative advantage. That is, some workers ￿nd
advantageous niches for their observed and unobserved skills in sectors or occupations
where jobs have a di⁄erent propensity to be exercised as formal salaried or independent.
On the other hand, for the formal-informal salaried margin all treatment parameters
are positive and large. That is, informal salaried employment carries signi￿cant earnings
penalties regardless of the propensity to select into formal salaried employment. There is
a considerable negative selection bias into formal relative to informal salaried work and
modest positive sorting based on expected earnings gains￿ resulting in an overall large
downward bias in conventional OLS formal-informal earnings gaps. That is, formal
salaried workers would lose out considerably were they to become informal salaried.
Overall, these results are less consistent with choice driven by compensating welfare
di⁄erentials and seem more consistent with segmentation. The results are robust to
di⁄erent empirical speci￿cations and are consistent with individuals￿reported reasons
31for being formal and informal salaried or self-employed.
Thus, the paper lends credence to both the ￿ exclusion￿and ￿ voluntary￿nature of
informal employment. Independent workers are largely voluntary and implicitly attach
signi￿cant value to the non-pecuniary bene￿ts of autonomous work. Meanwhile, informal
salaried workers tend to be excluded from more desirable jobs either formal salaried or
self-employed.
The existence of a sizeable earnings di⁄erential between informal and formal salaried
workers, unrelated to compensating di⁄erentials, has implications for the functioning of
labor markets in developing countries like Argentina. This can re￿ ect ￿ queues￿for formal
salaried sector jobs given that they are comparatively better-paid across the spectrum of
low and high paid jobs in the labor market and have social bene￿ts. This might be the
result of the labor market not being ￿ exible and competitive enough to equalize earnings
through arbitrage. This may re￿ ect numerous sources of labor segmentation, including
evasion of general taxes and labor market frictions. This may be addressed with tighter
enforcement of reformed labor and tax laws and improved collective bargaining.
The results suggest that independent workers reveal no willingness to pay for the
social protection bene￿ts, for instance social security or health coverage, that formal
wage earners enjoy. This highlights the issue of incentives for voluntary participation
in the social security system of workers with di⁄erent preferences regarding job ￿ exi-
bility, with di⁄erent concerns with respect to their future, with di⁄erent intertemporal
discount rates and who may derive di⁄erent levels of welfare from a particular bene￿t
package. Workers may have a heterogeneous willingness to pay or accept lower take-
home earnings in exchange for such bene￿ts depending on their preferences, the cost
and quality of the real and perceived services provided by the public and private sectors
and the characteristics of alternative sources of services and bene￿ts not related to the
32labor contract. Analyses like those provided in this paper for other developing country
contexts inform whether labor market segmentation or comparative advantage consid-
erations are features of the labor market and the choice of policy to address informality
in the labor market.
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39Appendix 1: Empirical methodology
The MTE outlined in equation (8) from Section 3 can be estimated with parametric,
polynomial and semiparametric techniques (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006).14 The
key term for the estimation is








is the function of unobservables given the particular propen-
sity score z and treatment decision. In the standard Heckit method this term would be
equivalent to the inverse Mills ratio. The MTE to be estimated is the following
MTE = (￿1 ￿ ￿2) + x
0(￿1 ￿ ￿2) + K
0(z) (10)
The parametric estimator estimated the MTE with the standard normal distribution
for the error terms/unobservables. This implies that it is possible to estimate the term
K0(z) as a function of the standard normal random variable. This results in a ￿ at MTE
across unobservables (Heckman, 2001).
Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) show that the MTE method in the semipara-
metric case relaxes the assumption of homogeneity of the MTE and assumes essential
heterogeneity. Here, wage outcomes of the occupational choice are heterogeneous and
individuals participate with partial knowledge of their individual gain or loss from the
labor market status, which di⁄ers among individuals (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil,
2006).
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001ab, 2005) show that the local instrumental variable
14This paper employs the recently developed MTE software by Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006). Please
refer to their paper and manual for a detailed description of the method. We are very grateful to Sergio Urzua
for invaluable help with the implementation of the routine.
40(LIV) estimator yields a semiparametric MTE. Following Heckman, Urzua and Vyt-
lacil (2006) (￿1 ￿￿2) and K0(z) need to be estimated. Values for (￿1 ￿￿2) are obtained
through a semiparametric double residual regression procedure (Robinson, 1998; Heck-
man, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998). Local linear regressions of regressors x on P(z)
and of outcomes y on P(z) provide the residuals, from which (￿1 ￿ ￿2) is obtained
through double residual regression. Then the term K0(z) is estimated with standard
nonparametric techniques. So, contrary to the parametric case, which exploits a known
functional form for the estimation of K0(z), here a more general form in the semiparamet-
ric case is estimated through nonparametric technique. From the results of (￿1￿￿2) and
K0(z) the semiparametric MTE is computed over the common support of the propen-
sity scores z (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006). Contrary to the parametric MTE
the estimates of the semiparametric MTE, using the local instrumental variables, does
not result in a ￿ at MTE across all unobservables. The treatment e⁄ect at the margin
is not homogeneous, but heterogeneous across di⁄erent levels of unobservables, which
determine participation in the occupation.
41Appendix 2: Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Formal and Informal salaried workers: Common Support 





















Source: Authors’ estimations based on EPH-C, INDEC.  
Figure 2: Formal and Informal salaried workers: MTE - parametric 










































Note: ci_l, ci_u: lower and upper confidence interval. Source: Authors’ estimations based on EPH-C, INDEC.  
  42Figure 3: Formal and Informal salaried workers: MTE – semiparametric 












































Note: ci_l, ci_u: lower and upper confidence interval. Source: Authors’ estimations based on EPH-C, INDEC.  
 
Figure 4: Formal salaried workers and Self-employed: Common Support 
 






















Source: Authors’ estimations based on EPH-C, INDEC.  
  43Figure 5: Formal salaried workers and Self-employed: MTE - parametric 
 










































Note: ci_l, ci_u: lower and upper confidence interval. Source: Authors’ estimations based on EPH-C, INDEC. 
 
Figure 6: Formal salaried workers and Self-employed: MTE – semiparametric 













































Note: ci_l, ci_u: lower and upper confidence interval. Source: Authors’ estimations based on EPH-C, INDEC. 
  44Figure 7: Informal salaried workers and Self-employed: Common Support 
 






















Source: Authors’ estimations based on EPH-C, INDEC.  
Figure 8: Informal salaried workers and Self-employed: MTE – parametric 
 










































Note: ci_l, ci_u: lower and upper confidence interval. Source: Authors’ estimations based on EPH-C, INDEC. 
  45Figure 9: Informal salaried workers and Self-employed: MTE – semiparametric 


















































  46Table 1: Formal and Informal salaried workers: Choice Model  
Probit Marginal effects
secondary education 0.471*** 0.178***
[0.026] [0.010]








primary sector -0.041 -0.016
[0.074] [0.030]
construction/trade/utility/transport sector -0.366*** -0.142***
[0.033] [0.013]
finance sector -0.100** -0.039**
[0.046] [0.018]












tenure: less than 1 year -1.375*** -0.508***
[0.026] [0.009]


















single parent -0.050* -0.019*
[0.025] [0.011]









Pseudo R-squared 0.2581 0.2581
Standard errors in brackets. 150 bootstrapping replications for probit regression.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C. 
Choice model
 
  47Table 2: Formal and Informal salaried workers: Outcome Equation - parametric 
coefficients stdv. sig.
D=1
α1+φ intercept 1.394 0.040 ***
β11 secondary education 0.152 0.018 ***
β21 tertiary education 0.482 0.029 ***
β31 experience 0.018 0.002 ***
β41 experience^2 0.000 0.000 ***
β51 female 0.017 0.013 **
β61 Pampeana -0.072 0.013 ***
β71 Cuyo -0.149 0.015 ***
β81 NOA -0.197 0.015 ***
β91 Patagonia 0.194 0.020 ***
β101 NEA -0.264 0.018 ***
β111 tenure less than 1 year 0.078 0.035 **
β121 tenure 1-5 years 0.007 0.020
β131 primary 0.262 0.047 ***
β141 construction/trade/utility/transport -0.015 0.015
β151 finance 0.020 0.021
β161 public and social services 0.090 0.014 ***
σ1 0.353 0.045 ***
D=0
α0 intercept 0.117 0.071 *
β10 secondary education -0.069 0.023 ***
β20 tertiary education 0.137 0.046 ***
β30 experience 0.008 0.002 ***
β40 experience^2 0.000 0.000 *
β50 female -0.003 0.022
β60 Pampeana -0.091 0.022 ***
β70 Cuyo -0.286 0.028 ***
β80 NOA -0.479 0.025 ***
β90 Patagonia -0.129 0.039 ***
β100 NEA -0.484 0.029 ***
β110 tenure less than 1 year 0.448 0.051 ***
β120 tenure 1-5 years 0.312 0.037 ***
β130 primary -0.004 0.054
β140 construction/trade/utility/transport 0.096 0.024 ***
β150 finance 0.261 0.045 ***
β160 public and social services 0.258 0.026 ***
σ0 0.645 0.055 ***
Note: sig.(significance): * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
stdv.: standard deviation
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C. 
Coefficients in the outcome equation - parametric
 
 
  48Table 3: Formal and Informal salaried workers: Outcome Equation – semiparametric 
coefficients stdv. sig.
β10 secondary education -0.131 0.027 ***
β20 tertiary education 0.053 0.053
β30 experience 0.004 0.003 *
β40 experience^2 0.000 0.000
β50 female -0.037 0.027 *
β60 Pampeana 0.020 0.031
β70 Cuyo -0.170 0.042 ***
β80 NOA -0.407 0.034 ***
β90 Patagonia 0.027 0.060
β100 NEA -0.380 0.043 ***
β110 tenure less than 1 year 0.250 0.063 ***
β120 tenure 1-5 years 0.062 0.059
β130 primary -0.292 0.084 ***
β140 construction/trade/utility/transport 0.114 0.033 ***
β150 finance 0.171 0.059 ***
β160 public and social services 0.183 0.040 ***
difference between betas (treatment betas-non-treatment betas)
secondary education 0.213 0.040 ***
tertiary education 0.211 0.058 ***
experience 0.008 0.004 **
experience^2 0.000 0.000
female 0.215 0.036 ***
Pampeana -0.161 0.044 ***
Cuyo -0.042 0.056
NOA 0.216 0.050 ***
Patagonia -0.066 0.075
NEA 0.068 0.063
tenure less than 1 year 0.197 0.086 **
tenure 1-5 years 0.265 0.070 ***
primary 0.757 0.110 ***
construction/trade/utility/transport -0.089 0.048 **
finance -0.087 0.076
public and social services -0.020 0.057
Note: sig.(significance): * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
stdv.: standard deviation
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C. 







  49Table 4: Formal salaried workers and Self-employed: Choice Model 
Probit Marginal effects
secondary education 0.158 0.049*
[0.101] [0.029]






tenure: less than 1 year -0.527*** -0.185***
[0.110] [0.040]




















single parent -0.041 -0.013
[0.112] [0.037]









Pseudo R-squared 0.2126 0.2126
Standard errors in brackets. 150 bootstrapping replications for probit regression.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




  50Table 5: Formal salaried workers and Self-employed: Outcome equation – parametric  
coefficients stdv. sig.
D=1
α1+φ intercept 1.072 0.065 ***
β11 secondary education 0.341 0.041 ***
β21 tertiary education 0.907 0.044 ***
β31 experience 0.027 0.004 ***
β41 experience^2 0.000 0.000 ***
β51 tenure less than 1 year -0.247 0.050 ***
β61 tenure 1-5 years -0.163 0.035 ***
β71 female -0.124 0.027 ***
σ1 -0.035 0.059
D=0
α0 intercept 1.260 0.291 ***
β10 secondary education 0.239 0.101 ***
β20 tertiary education 1.024 0.098 ***
β30 experience 0.026 0.010 ***
β40 experience^2 0.000 0.000 ***
β50 tenure less than 1 year -0.355 0.118 ***
β60 tenure 1-5 years -0.347 0.102 ***
β70 female -0.360 0.078 ***
σ0 -0.245 0.128 **
Note: sig.(significance): * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
stdv.: standard deviation
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C. 













  51Table 6: Formal salaried workers and Self-employed: Outcome equation – 
semiparametric 
coefficients stdv. sig.
β10 secondary education 0.297 0.163 **
β20 tertiary education 1.268 0.175 ***
β30 experience 0.043 0.014 ***
β40 experience^2 -0.001 0.000 ***
β50 tenure less than 1 year -0.244 0.161 *
β60 tenure 1-5 years -0.387 0.145 ***
β70 female -0.563 0.119 ***
difference between betas (treatment betas-non-treatment betas)
secondary education 0.006 0.216
tertiary education -0.465 0.230 **
experience -0.023 0.018
experience^2 0.000 0.000
tenure less than 1 year -0.081 0.219
tenure 1-5 years 0.228 0.183
female 0.522 0.148 ***
Note: sig.(significance): * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
stdv.: standard deviation
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C. 

















  52Table 7: Informal salaried workers and Self-employed: Choice Model  
Probit Marginal effects
secondary education -0.236** -0.088**
[0.098] [0.036]






tenure: less than 1 year 0.733*** 0.253***
[0.108] [0.031]




















single parent 0.036 0.013
[0.127] [0.044]









Pseudo R-squared 0.2324 0.2324
Standard errors in brackets. 150 bootstrapping replications for probit regression.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%








α1+φ intercept 0.764 0.108 ***
β11 secondary education 0.108 0.051 **
β21 tertiary education 0.731 0.078 ***
β31 experience 0.027 0.006 ***
β41 experience^2 0.000 0.000 ***
β51 tenure less than 1 year -0.213 0.071 ***
β61 tenure 1-5 years -0.015 0.067
β71 female -0.014 0.053
σ1 -0.030 0.113
D=0
α0 intercept 1.413 0.265 ***
β10 secondary education 0.128 0.108
β20 tertiary education 0.777 0.130 ***
β30 experience 0.024 0.010 ***
β40 experience^2 0.000 0.000 ***
β50 tenure less than 1 year -0.040 0.145
β60 tenure 1-5 years -0.185 0.102 **
β70 female -0.235 0.086 ***
σ0 -0.463 0.157 ***
Note: sig.(significance): * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
stdv.: standard deviation
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C. 













  54Table 9: Informal salaried workers and Self-employed: Outcome equation – 
semiparametric 
coefficients stdv. sig.
β10 secondary education 0.456 0.136 ***
β20 tertiary education 1.066 0.158 ***
β30 experience 0.023 0.014 **
β40 experience^2 0.000 0.000 *
β50 tenure less than 1 year -0.139 0.220
β60 tenure 1-5 years -0.124 0.149
β70 female -0.139 0.157
difference between betas (treatment betas-non-treatment betas)
secondary education -0.536 0.191 ***
tertiary education -0.569 0.233 ***
experience -0.001 0.017
experience^2 0.000 0.000
tenure less than 1 year -0.042 0.295
tenure 1-5 years 0.066 0.242
female 0.105 0.206
Note: sig.(significance): * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
stdv.: standard deviation
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C. 

















  55Table 10: Treatment Parameters: Parametric 
F vs I F vs SE I vs SE
Treatment on the Treated 1.624*** -0.030 -0.581***
[0.093] [0.177] [0.209]
Treatment on the Untreated 1.079*** 0.231*** -0.040
[0.073] [0.098] [0.187]
Average Treatment Effect 1.392*** 0.049 -0.369**
[0.066] [0.135] [0.160]
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
standard deviations in brackets
F: Formal salaried, I: Informal salaried, SE: self-employed




Table 11: Treatment Parameters: Semiparametric 
F vs I F vs SE I vs SE
Treatment on the Treated 1.724*** 0.033 -0.496*
[0.096] [0.303] [0.309]
Treatment on the Untreated 2.122*** 0.034 -0.522**
[0.118] [0.150] [0.249]
Average Treatment Effect 1.893*** 0.044 -0.486**
[0.089] [0.215] [0.211]
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
standard deviations in brackets
F: Formal salaried, I: Informal salaried, SE: self-employed




Table 12: Treatment Parameters: Polynomial 
F vs I F vs SE I vs SE
Treatment on the Treated 2.088*** 0.187 -0.449
[0.187] [0.443] [0.426]
Treatment on the Untreated 1.892*** -0.122 -0.989**
[0.204] [0.245] [0.510]
Average Treatment Effect 2.002*** 0.105 -0.600***
[0.105] [0.291] [0.244]
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
standard deviations in brackets
F: Formal salaried, I: Informal salaried, SE: self-employed




  56Table 13: Treatment Parameters: Semiparametric Version 2 
F vs I F vs SE I vs SE
Treatment on the Treated 1.972*** 0.069 -0.468*
[0.161] [0.354] [0.354]
Treatment on the Untreated 1.788*** 0.014 -0.599**
[0.168] [0.170] [0.319]
Average Treatment Effect 1.892*** 0.063 -0.496**
[0.098] [0.242] [0.220]
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
standard deviations in brackets
F: Formal salaried, I: Informal salaried, SE: self-employed
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C. 




Table 14: Comparison of Bias and Gains 
Note: Based on Treatment Parameter tables from Authors' estimations of the EPH-C.
OLS compared with treatment parameters from MTE estimations. 
Semiparametric 2: Semiparametric regression based on polynomial






































Treatment Parameters: Selection Bias, Sorting Gain and Total Bias



























  57Table 15: OLS regressions 
dependent variable: log hourly wage F vs I F vs SE I vs SE
(1) (2) (3)
choice       1/ 0.507*** 0.284*** 0.010
[57.33] [8.53] [0.23]
secondary education 0.184*** 0.309*** 0.153***
[18.22] [7.33] [3.16]
tertiary education 0.619*** 0.942*** 0.872***
[52.42] [21.06] [15.15]
experience 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.031***
[23.76] [7.66] [7.42]
experience^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[17.51] [6.09] [6.04]
tenure less than 1 year -0.152*** -0.268*** -0.297***
[13.55] [5.78] [5.53]
tenure 1-5 years -0.105*** -0.206*** -0.166***
[10.92] [5.88] [3.37]
female -0.085*** -0.200*** -0.142***
[10.21] [6.49] [3.60]
primary 0.143*** … …
[5.02] … …
construction/trade/utility/transport -0.060*** … …
[4.78] … …
finance 0.085*** … …
[4.80] … …
public and social services 0.127*** … …
[9.83] … …
Pampeana -0.093*** … …
[8.85] … …
Cuyo -0.223*** … …
[16.18] … …
NOA -0.379*** … …
[32.08] … …
Patagonia 0.211*** … …
[13.97] … …
NEA -0.404*** … …
[27.98] … …
Constant 0.744*** 0.834*** 0.821***
[35.36] [10.91] [9.14]
Observations 21865 1924 1505
R-squared 0.468 0.306 0.217
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
F: Formal, SE: self-employed, I: informal
1/ Choice dummy: estimates the average treatment effect 
column 1: Choice: formal=1, informal=0
column 2: Choice: formal=1, self-employed=0
column 3: Choice: informal=1, self-employed=0








indicator value 1 if not missing data in sample, intercept 
choice choice/participation variable (0 or 1, depending on margin)
lnwage log of wage/hourly labour income
primary primary education (complete/incomplete)
secondary secondary education (complete/incomplete), base primary
tertiary tertiary education (complete/incomplete), base primary
exp experience=age - years of education - six 
exp2 experience squared
female gender variable (1=female, 0=male)
pampa Pampeana, base GBA
cuyo Cuyo, base GBA
noa Noroeste, base GBA
pata Patagonia, base GBA
nea Nordeste, base GBA
gba Gran Buenos Aires
te1 less than 1 year' tenure, base 'more than 5 years' tenure
te2 1 year to 5 years' tenure, base 'more than 5 years' tenure
te3 more than 5 years' tenure
sea1 primary sector, base manufacturing
sea2 manufacturing
sea3 construction/trade/utility/transport, base manufacturing
sea4 finance, base manufacturing
sea5 public and social services, base manufacturing
single marital status (1=single, 0=married/separated/widow)
single_female single*female interaction term
children <=6 children under or equal 6  in household
children <=6_female children under or equal 6 in household*female interaction term
hhs. size household size
pension_hh hhs.head/spouse with pension
hhs. head houshold head (1=if household head, 0=otherwise)
pension_head hhs.head/spouse with pension* hhs.head/spouse interaction
single parent lives in household with only household head and no spouse
hhs.human capital  maximum education level in the household
gdp provincial GDP per capita
check05 number of inspected workers per 1000 people, 2005
taste preference for occupation (1=choice/opportunity reasons, 0=involuntary/income reasons)   






  59Descriptive statistics 
Variable Sample 1 Formal Informal
log of wages 1.436 1.733 1.041
[0.726] [0.585] [0.708]
primary education 0.283 0.198 0.396
[0.450] [0.398] [0.489]
secondary education 0.391 0.376 0.411
[0.488] [0.484] [0.492]
tertiary education 0.326 0.427 0.193
[0.469] [0.495] [0.395]
experience 20.689 20.923 20.377
[14.151] [13.265] [15.244]
experience^2 628.269 613.735 647.582
[736.131] [675.396] [809.454]
Regions
Pampeana 0.222 0.224 0.220
[0.416] [0.417] [0.414]
Cuyo 0.069 0.068 0.071
[0.254] [0.251] [0.257]
NOA 0.089 0.079 0.101
[0.284] [0.270] [0.301]
Patagonia 0.028 0.036 0.018
[0.166] [0.186] [0.134]
NEA 0.042 0.039 0.046
[0.200] [0.194] [0.209]
GBA 0.550 0.554 0.544
[0.498] [0.497] [0.498]
Tenure
less than 1 year 0.271 0.137 0.450
[0.445] [0.343] [0.498]
1-5 years 0.340 0.317 0.369
[0.474] [0.465] [0.483]
more than 5 years 0.389 0.546 0.181
[0.488] [0.498] [0.385]
Economic Sectors
primary 0.012 0.011 0.013
[0.109] [0.104] [0.114]
manufacturing 0.150 0.163 0.132
[0.357] [0.370] [0.339]
construction/trade/utility/transport 0.332 0.275 0.409
[0.471] [0.446] [0.492]
finance 0.088 0.106 0.063
[0.283] [0.308] [0.243]
public and social services 0.418 0.445 0.383
[0.493] [0.497] [0.486]
Sample Size 21865 12616 9249
Population 5441504 3104906 2336598
Note: Standard deviation in brackets. Weighted Averages. Urban Argentina.
Sample 1: Formal and Informal salaried workers 
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C, Census 2001 and Ministry of Labor data. 
Summary statistics, 2nd semester 2005 - Part I of II
 
  60Variable Sample 1 Formal Informal
Household and individual characteristics
female 0.435 0.402 0.478
[0.496] [0.490] [0.500]
single 0.312 0.264 0.376
[0.463] [0.441] [0.484]
single_female 0.143 0.127 0.166
[0.350] [0.333] [0.372]
children <=6 0.475 0.435 0.529
[0.771] [0.722] [0.830]
children <=6_female 0.170 0.140 0.211
[0.498] [0.443] [0.560]
hhs. size 4.028 3.791 4.343
[2.052] [1.831] [2.275]
pension_hh 0.251 0.294 0.194
[0.433] [0.455] [0.395]
hhs. head 0.496 0.556 0.416
[0.500] [0.497] [0.493]
pension_head 0.162 0.210 0.100
[0.369] [0.407] [0.299]
single parent 0.294 0.258 0.341
[0.456] [0.438] [0.474]
hhs.human capital 8.580 9.367 7.535
[5.300] [5.422] [4.945]
Provincial characteristics
gdp 9.260 9.823 8.512
[6.281] [6.693] [5.600]
check05 9.759 10.271 9.078
[6.251] [6.651] [5.605]
Sample Size 21865 12616 9249
Population 5441504 3104906 2336598
Note: Standard deviation in brackets. Weighted Averages. Urban Argentina.
Sample 1: Formal and Informal salaried workers.
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C, Census 2001 and Ministry of Labor data. 
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  61Variable Sample 2 Sample 3 Formal Informal Self-employed
log of wages 1.685 1.281 1.788 1.175 1.453
[0.768] [0.835] [0.615] [0.699] [0.996]
primary education 0.270 0.411 0.213 0.417 0.400
[0.444] [0.492] [0.409] [0.493] [0.490]
secondary education 0.349 0.366 0.374 0.410 0.294
[0.477] [0.482] [0.484] [0.492] [0.456]
tertiary education 0.380 0.223 0.414 0.173 0.305
[0.486] [0.416] [0.493] [0.378] [0.461]
experience 23.590 24.607 20.954 21.588 29.541
[14.896] [15.627] [13.894] [15.008] [15.373]
experience^2 778.257 849.531 631.958 691.042 1108.569
[852.947] [914.632] [720.908] [803.967] [1020.164]
Tenure
less than 1 year 0.151 0.342 0.143 0.446 0.171
[0.358] [0.474] [0.350] [0.497] [0.377]
1-5 years 0.332 0.347 0.330 0.354 0.337
[0.471] [0.476] [0.470] [0.478] [0.473]
more than 5 years 0.516 0.311 0.527 0.200 0.492
[0.500] [0.463] [0.499] [0.400] [0.500]
Household and individual characteristics
female 0.377 0.434 0.395 0.494 0.335
[0.485] [0.496] [0.489] [0.500] [0.472]
single 0.238 0.241 0.289 0.314 0.121
[0.426] [0.428] [0.454] [0.464] [0.326]
single_female 0.111 0.106 0.136 0.137 0.055
[0.314] [0.308] [0.343] [0.344] [0.227]
children <=6 0.395 0.456 0.398 0.499 0.387
[0.687] [0.762] [0.678] [0.791] [0.708]
children <=6_female 0.117 0.162 0.124 0.199 0.101
[0.402] [0.460] [0.410] [0.498] [0.382]
hhs. size 3.717 4.068 3.655 4.197 3.858
[1.761] [2.044] [1.679] [2.103] [1.928]
pension_hh 0.248 0.189 0.278 0.195 0.179
[0.432] [0.392] [0.448] [0.397] [0.384]
hhs. head 0.590 0.522 0.549 0.425 0.682
[0.492] [0.500] [0.498] [0.495] [0.466]
pension_head 0.173 0.126 0.186 0.117 0.141
[0.378] [0.332] [0.390] [0.322] [0.349]
single parent 0.251 0.275 0.267 0.311 0.216
[0.434] [0.447] [0.443] [0.463] [0.412]
hhs.human capital  9.345 8.206 9.543 7.784 8.898
[5.625] [5.271] [5.558] [4.908] [5.753]
Preference for occupation
taste 0.321 0.205 0.347 0.170 0.263
[0.221] [0.221] [0.217] [0.215] [0.218]
prefer 0.512 0.471 0.619 0.594 0.269
[0.500] [0.499] [0.486] [0.491] [0.444]
Sample Size 1924 1505 1353 934 571
Population 2508926 2028855 1738791 1258720 770135
Note: Standard deviation in brackets. Weighted averages. GBA.
Sample 2: Formal salaried workers and self-employed. Sample 3: Informal salaried workers and self-employed.
Source: Authors' estimations based on the EPH-C and EPH-C Informality module. 
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  62